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Executive Summary
Disinformation and political propaganda are as old as politics itself. In recent 
years however social media platforms have led to an unprecedented increase in 
its spread. False information with the intent to deceive and manipulate can be 
distributed faster, cheaper and to a larger audience than ever before. 
Concerns about these new and dynamic ways to spread falsehoods have brought 
politicians and regulators onto the stage. Together with stakeholders, the Europe-
an Commission has negotiated the European Code of Practice on Disinformation 
with social media platforms and is considering further far-reaching legislation. 
The difficult question however is what kind of approach is best suited at EU-level 
to curb the spread of disinformation on social media.
This paper provides arguments in favour of a co-regulatory approach to achieve 
these ends instead of the current self-regulatory approach or direct regulation. In 
a co-regulatory setting, the EU would set out principles and objectives in a legis-
lative act with regards to tackling disinformation. Social media companies would 
then in a Code of Conduct commit to introducing measures against disinforma-
tion based on these principles. The Code of Conduct would be developed by the 
platforms together with civil society representatives under the guidance and 
monitoring by the Commission.
The Code of Conduct should be developed towards the following objectives: 
•	 Increase transparency of content distribution. This entails both transparency 
about the algorithmic curation of content as well as transparency about the ma-
nipulation and abuse of social media platforms by fake accounts and coordinat-
ed inauthentic behaviour.
•	 Improve content management. This entails principles and guidelines for human 
as well as automatic content moderation and for professional fact-checking or-
ganizations.
•	 Improve independent public knowledge about the social dynamics on social me-
dia platforms. This entails independent access for academic research to granular 
data in compliance with the GDPR.
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1 The Political Debate around Disinformation
What is disinformation? The term may well be routinely used in public discourse, 
but two people rarely mean the same thing when referring to it. Using the defini-
tion as employed by the European Commission, this paper refers to disinformation 
as “verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and dis-
seminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause 
public harm. ‚Public harm‘ includes threats to democratic processes as well as to 
public goods such as Union citizens’ health, environment or security.”1 
The emphasis on the intention to deceive is important. It delineates disinfor-
mation from mere misinformation. Misinformation can be incorrect or mislead-
ing information, which is distributed or shared inadvertently. Disinformation, 
whether politically or economically motivated, has always played a role in po-
litical and media discourse. In recent years however, the eruption of global so-
cial media platforms has led to an unprecedented increase in its spread. False 
information with the intent to deceive and manipulate can be distributed faster, 
cheaper and to a larger audience than ever before. Thanks to vast data collection 
by digital platforms and profiling of its users, it has become possible to deliver 
curated misleading political ads, conspiracy theories or foreign political propa-
ganda to customised audiences. 
Concerns about these new and dynamic ways to spread falsehoods have brought 
politicians and regulators onto the stage. The efforts of social media companies 
to tackle disinformation by themselves are increasingly seen as insufficient.2 To-
gether with stakeholders, the European Commission has negotiated the European 
Code of Practice on Disinformation with social media platforms and is considering 
further far-reaching legislation. The planned update of the 2000 E-Commerce Di-
rective into a Digital Services Act demonstrates political commitment on the part 
of both the Commission and most member states to reform intermediary liability 
for online platforms in general.3 For social media platforms as a subset of online 
platforms, it will aim at slowing down the distribution of illegal content (such as 
hate speech) online and pushing platforms to take more proactive steps against 
abuse of their Terms and Services. The political momentum behind this legislative 
package should also be employed to build a regulatory framework to tackle disin-
formation on social media platforms.
1.1 A Regulatory Answer to Disinformation: Complicated
In its June 2018 conclusions the European Council explicitly invited the Commis-
sion and the High Representative to develop an action plan with specific proposals 
for a coordinated EU response to the challenges of disinformation. The EU is better 
suited to deal with disinformation than member states’ governments: By setting 
rules for the entire Single Market for social media platforms it can effectively avoid 
regulatory fragmentation in this crucial area. Representing a market of hundreds 
1 European Commission, Code of Practice on Disinformation, 26.09.2018 
2 Florian Eder, Věra Jourová: Platforms ‘need to open up’ algorithms to deal with disinfor­
mation, Politico, 12.06.2019. 
3 European Commission, Leaked Document on Digital Services Act, published by Netzpolitik.org, 
16.07.2019 
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of millions of potential users of their services, the European Commission is also in 
a much better position to negotiate with the social media platforms.
The difficult question however is what kind of approach is best suited at EU-level 
to curb the spread of disinformation on social media. Regulating this policy area is 
much more sensitive than setting rules for most other industries. Social media plat-
forms enable private and public exchanges to take place on an unprecedented scale 
and with a previously unheard-of reach. Any regulation geared at curbing these ex-
changes risks infringing the freedom of expression enjoyed by European citizens. 
These objections should not mean that European policymakers should shy away 
from acting. Social media platforms are part of the problem that needs to be 
addressed by the EU. Their online communication architectures are highly con-
ducive to spreading disinformation. Algorithmic content curation by social me-
dia platforms favours maximizing user engagement, which in turn leads to fa-
vouring more emotional, sensationalist or partisan content that is more likely to 
include disinformation.4 
The openness of social media platforms has also led to an explosion of fake ac-
counts and of so-called ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour’. Such techniques are 
heavily used to spread commercial and political disinformation, to create false 
impressions of the virality or popularity of certain profiles, or to support for mis-
leading narratives. For one recent report prepared by the NATO Strategic Commu-
nications Centre of Excellence, researchers managed to buy 25,000 fake ‚likes‘ and 
more than 3500 fake comments on various social networks – for €300.5 By its own 
admission, which has not been independently verified, Facebook had around 392 
million “duplicate, undesirable, misclassified or false” accounts on its platform by 
the end of 2019 and claims that “duplicate accounts represent approximately 11 
per cent of monthly active users while fake versions make up another 5 per cent”6. 
Current attempts by social media platforms at content moderation and fake ac-
count detection have failed to effectively counter inauthentic coordinated behav-
iour as former European Commissioner for security, Julian King, made clear at the 
end of October 2019.7
In short: Without stricter rules, a credible threat of enforcement and the possibility 
to monitor algorithms and anti-disinformation measures of social media compa-
nies, the EU risks not only letting private companies set the de facto standards and 
parameters for exchanges and political discourse online across the Single Market. 
It also risks seeing the social fabric and democratic institutions in member states 
and at the EU level weakened by torrents of disinformation and propaganda. 
4 Joshua Tucker et al. Social Media, Political Polarization and Political Disinformation: A Review 
of the Scientific Literature, 03.2018 
5 Sebastian Bey, Rolf Fredheim, Falling Behind. How Social Media Companies are Failing to 
Combat Inauthentic Behaviour Online, Report prepared by the NATO Strategic Communica-
tions Centre of Excellence, 06.12.2019.  
6 Elaine Moore, Hannah Murphy, Facebook’s Fake Numbers Problem – Lex in Depth, Financial 
Times, 18.11.2019
7 Daniel Boffey, EU disputes Facebook‘s claims of progress against fake accounts, TheGuardian, 
29.10.2019.  
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The task at hand is hence to find a solution that protects freedom of expression 
while steering social media platforms towards two sets of actions:
1. Measures that better curb the spread of disinformation and inauthentic be-
haviour. 
2. Measures that lead to greater transparency of algorithmic content curation 
and content moderation and create effective monitoring of said measures 
against disinformation. 
This paper provides arguments in favour of a co-regulatory approach to achieve 
these ends instead of the current self-regulatory approach or direct regulation. In 
a co-regulatory setting, the EU would set out principles and objectives in a legis-
lative act with regards to tackling disinformation. Social media companies would 
then in a Code of Conduct commit to introducing measures against disinforma-
tion based on these principles. The Code of Conduct would be developed by the 
platforms together with civil society representatives under the guidance and 
monitoring by the Commission. This paper formulates principles for a co-regulato-
ry framework on disinformation and argues in favour of an approach that targets 
content distribution instead of content itself. A co-regulatory approach should be 
complemented by an independent body to monitor the measures deployed by so-
cial media companies against disinformation. 
2 Finding the right regulatory approach to 
combat disinformation on the European level
With the aim of increasing efficiency and flexibility, the EU increasingly uses 
self-regulatory or co-regulatory mechanisms to implement rules enshrined in Eu-
ropean legislation.8 This is especially true with regards to internet governance and 
the governance of the platform economy, which is comprised of digital architec-
tures like social media companies that can regulate user behaviour flexibly and 
dynamically by changing code. In its 2016 Communication on Online Platforms, 
the Commission proposed self- and co-regulation on the assumption that such 
measures could to a degree replace top-down legislation in this area of the digi-
tal economy.9 Self-regulation and co-regulation are private-public mechanisms for 
setting rules and standards. 
Under a self-regulatory or co-regulatory mechanism, for example a Code of Con-
duct, individual companies or companies within an industry develop their own 
standards and guidelines together with relevant stakeholders such as business 
associations, social partners or NGOs. The difference between self-regulation and 
8 The 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making defines co-regulation as the 
‘mechanism whereby a Community legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objec-
tives defined by the legislative authority to parties which are recognised in the field (such 
as economic operators, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, or associations).’ 
Self-regulation is defined as the ‘possibility for economic operators, the social partners, 
non-governmental organisations or associations to adopt among themselves and for them-
selves common guidelines at European level (particularly codes of practice or sectoral agree-
ments).’ Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Law Making, 2003 C321/01 
9 Michèle Finck, Digital Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal Framework for the Plat­
form Economy, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 15/2017 
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co-regulation lies in the degree of involvement of the Commission. In a co-regula-
tory approach, the Commission sets out legally binding principles and objectives, 
has to approve industry-developed standards, while measures by the platforms 
are monitored by an independent body.
Various forms of self- and co-regulatory mechanisms are being used today by mem-
ber states as well as at EU level in dozens of industries. Internet governance has a 
particularly long history of using self-regulatory and co-regulatory approaches in 
member states and at the EU level.10 Private Domain Name Registry Operators, for 
example, are often governed by a co-regulatory framework through which govern-
ments exercise control over the process of domain name registration.11 
Self-regulatory mechanisms are already used to change social media companies’ 
practices towards content regulation and to combat disinformation at European 
level, with the European Code of Practice on Disinformation. However, this ap-
proach has so far failed to combat disinformation effectively. 
2.1  Why self-regulation is not enough 
Self-regulatory measures in the EU can take various forms ranging from voluntary 
measures by the industry to more supervised forms of industry-led rulemaking with 
the involvement of other stakeholders. They have, to a certain degree, helped push 
platforms into stepping up their measures against disinformation in the last years 
in the Single Market. In a European Code of Practice on Disinformation and Politi-
cal Advertising, social media platforms have, for example, committed themselves 
to adopting stronger measures to fight disinformation.12 Signatories of the Code of 
Practice, among them all large social media companies and online ad associations 
groups operating in the EU, have committed themselves to better detection and 
identification of bots and agreed not to “prohibit or discourage good faith research 
into disinformation and political advertising on their platforms”.13 They also signed 
up to publishing annual public reports on their efforts against disinformation. 
However, these measures have not created enough transparency about how the 
companies are dealing with disinformation and have not led to publicly verifia-
ble results about their success. The Sounding Board of civil society stakeholders 
which was involved in the process of creating the Code of Practice immediately 
voiced concerns about the inadequacy of the measures.14 Due to its largely volun-
tary nature, the Code of Practice does not include transparency obligations with 
regards to the digital architecture of social media platforms. The voluntary na-
ture of commitments within the self-regulatory mechanism also prevents any real 
enforcement of the commitments to improve content moderation or to facilitate 
comprehensive data exchange between researchers and social media platforms. 
10 Chris Marsden, Options for and Effectiveness of Internet Self­ and Co­Regulation, Prepared 
for the Steering Committee, Rand Europe, 27.06.2007. 
11 Chris Marsden, Trisha Meyer and Ian Brown, Platform Values and democratic elections: 
How can the law regulate digital disinformation? Computer Law & Security Review: The In-
ternational Journal of Technology Law and Practice, 15.11.2019. 
12 European Commission, Code of Practice on Disinformation, 26.09.2018 
13 Ibid. 
14 European Commission, The Sounding Board’s Unanimous Final Report on the so­called 
Code of Practice, 24.09.2018. 
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2.2  Effectiveness of measures cannot be independently verified 
Human content moderators cannot review the billions of posts uploaded daily on 
social media platforms. Employing automatic decision-making systems for con-
tent moderation and fake account detection is hence inevitable. Social media com-
panies use a mix of technical means (such as image recognition) as well as human 
moderators and so-called ‘trusted flaggers’ to moderate content online. However, 
authorities have no means to independently verify the accuracy or effectiveness of 
these measures within the framework of the Code of Practice. 
The reason for this is that the commitments in the Code of Practice are not legally 
binding and cannot be enforced. If transparency reports do not contain all the neces-
sary information policymakers cannot assess the platforms’ claims. At the same time, 
they cannot force the platforms to provide the necessary additional information. 
2.3  Information asymmetry 
The Code of Practice also contains no mechanism to monitor the effects that al-
gorithmic content curation decisions made by the platforms have on public dis-
course or the media. These decisions, such as the pivot to video in the newsfeed 
of Facebook, can however have drastic consequences for private and commercial 
users of social media platforms. After Facebook changed its newsfeed algorithms 
to favour video over text and downgraded political content, hundreds of news-
papers saw their online revenues drop drastically almost overnight.15 A small 
technical change thereby had a profound impact on the media diet of millions of 
Europeans; but its effects on political discourse and on the distribution of disin-
formation remain completely opaque. A future European regulatory framework 
needs to address this absence of transparency in algorithmic content curation. 
Since social media platforms are unlikely to voluntarily agree to make enough 
relevant information available to the public or at least to the Commission, any 
new regulatory framework will have to include obligations on the transparency 
of algorithmic content curation.
The current lack of transparency over the effects of algorithmic changes is an ex-
ample for a larger problem between social media and regulators as well other 
relevant stakeholders. There is a general information asymmetry and subsequent 
knowledge gap between social media platforms and everyone else. Social media 
platforms obtain live data on social and communication dynamics from which they 
can draw inferences on disinformation, propaganda, or the effectiveness of polit-
ical ads. They are the only ones in possession of reliable data on the exact num-
bers of fake accounts on their platforms as well as on the prevalence and effects 
of coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This data and knowledge are of immense 
relevance for policymakers, for example when the integrity of elections is con-
cerned. Yet, most social media platforms do not provide authorities and research-
ers enough access and granular data to study these phenomena independently 
and in full detail despite the commitments made in the Code of Practice. 
15 Alexis Madrigal, Robinson Meyer, How Facebook’s Chaotic Push Into Video Cost Hundreds 
of Journalists Their Jobs, 18.10.2018. 
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2.4 Why legally binding rules for social media platforms could backfire 
The shortcomings of the Code of Practice in addressing disinformation should 
however not lead to the conclusion that direct regulation of content on social 
media platforms would be the preferable option. In theory, the EU could enact a 
law that is similar in structure and intent to the German Netzwerkdurchsetzungs­
gesetz (NetzDG) but serves to curb disinformation. Germany enacted the law in 
2017 to stop the spread of illegal content by changing the intermediary liability 
rules for platforms. It requires them to take down flagged content that is ‘mani-
festly unlawful’ under the German Criminal Code within 24 hours of receiving any 
complaint from a user, public authority or trusted flagger.16 In cases requiring a 
prolonged examination of the legality of the flagged post the complaint must be 
handled within a week.
Three reasons speak against a similar approach at European level, i.e. the EU mak-
ing binding rules on the content management of social media platforms in order 
to tackle disinformation. 
First, most of the content in question is not strictly illegal. Some will be illegal, 
some in a legal grey zone; other forms of disinformation might just be socially 
undesirable. Legally mandating the deletion of such content would thereby simply 
amount to censorship. It could still be argued that a law should be designed to 
take down disinformation that is also illegal or disinformation which poses a clear 
danger to public safety or health, but this would not go very far either. 
Secondly, under such an approach, social media companies would become the 
arbiters of truth. They would have to decide for hundreds of thousands of posts 
flagged as disinformation every day whether they individually contain disinforma-
tion as defined by law or not. At such a scale it is simply impossible for humans to 
make judgements accurately for every single post. In practice, such a legal man-
date would lead social media platforms to install strong content filters. These fil-
ters would delete massive amounts of content that its algorithms have identified 
as disinformation before it can even be published. 
Such an approach would be especially counterproductive since, third, the actual 
societal impact of disinformation is empirically poorly researched. A recent book 
by Yochai Benkler and co-authors analysing dozens of studies from an Ameri-
can context suggests there is no conclusive evidence both on the efficacy of hy-
per-partisan and micro-targeted political online advertising on voting behaviour 
and on the direct effects of online interference by foreign actors on voting be-
haviour.17 Disinformation most likely poses a danger to the fabric of European so-
cieties beyond elections, for example by contributing to an increasing polariza-
tion of societies or digital tribalism.18 Existing evidence on the causal mechanism 
of internet use and polarization is, however, too weak to justify regulation that 
16 For example, an NGO, journalistic network or foundation which entered into an agree-
ment with the large social media companies. 
17 Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, Hal Robert, Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, 
and Radicalization in American Politics, 10.2018 
18 Samantha North, Lukasz Piwek, Adam Jonson, Battle for Britain: Analysing drivers of polit­
ical tribalism in online discussions about Brexit in: A. Aker, D. Albakour, A. Barr´on-Cede˜no, S. 
Dori-Hacohen, M. Martinez, J. Stray, S. Tippmann (eds.): Proceedings of the NewsIR’19 Work-
shop at SIGIR, Paris, France, 25.07.2019 
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would lead to a massive infringement of a fundamental right.19 A key problem 
in this regard is also that most research on the societal impact of social media 
companies hails from the US and American data, while such effects in the EU are 
not very well researched.
For all these reasons, the EU should refrain from mandating social media plat-
forms to police content directly. Instead, the EU should focus on how the platforms 
tackle two main drivers of the spread of disinformation, namely fake accounts and 
inauthentic behaviour. This in turn requires a lot more transparency about the 
distribution and managing of content by social media platforms. To attain more 
transparency and to make social media platforms accountable for their tackling of 
fake accounts and inauthentic behaviour, a co-regulatory approach is much better 
suited than a pure top-down approach. 
3 Why co-regulation strikes the right balance
A co-regulatory framework has an efficiency and flexibility advantage over direct 
regulation and is more inclusive. Social media companies operate technologi-
cally complex systems and manage complex and dynamic social interactions at 
a vast scale. The techniques and channels used to distribute disinformation for 
example regularly change. Direct regulation would most likely fail to incorporate 
this complexity of interactions and create rules that are not adaptable to the 
technical realities of individual platforms. A well-intended law to increase trans-
parency and accountability with regards to inauthentic coordinated behaviour 
could force social media platforms to delete large amount of non-illegal content. 
In a co-regulatory setting, legally binding principles and objectives for transpar-
ency can be set out by the EU. They are then developed into a Code of Conduct in 
close cooperation with the platforms, which have the expertise and the leeway 
needed to technically implement the Code. Participation of various stakeholders 
in the development of the Code of Conduct ensures that the interests of civil 
society, the media or academia are factored in. 
Co-regulatory frameworks in the EU context usually have three layers: The stat-
utory layer of general principles and objectives which the EU develops in a leg-
islative act; the co-regulatory layer where the industry and other relevant stake-
holders form a body that develop a Code of Conduct based on the principles and 
objectives fixed in EU legislation; and a third layer where companies develop 
concrete measures to implement the Code of Conduct. These measures have in 
turn to be approved by the EU-Commission. An independent monitoring board, 
for example consisting of stakeholders from civil society or academia monitors 
the process and effectiveness of its implementation. One example for such a 
framework is the EU approach to countering illegal hate speech online.20
In the fight against disinformation such an approach has several advantages. It is 
more legally binding and has more teeth than self-regulation. At the same time, 
19 Sebastian Deri, Internet Use and Political Polarization: A Review, Cornell University, 
06.11.2019. 
20 Chris Marsden, Trisha Meyer and Ian Brown, Platform Values and democratic elections: How 
can the law regulate digital disinformation? Computer Law & Security Review: The International 
Journal of Technology Law and Practice, 15.11.2019. 
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it can make use of the efficiency of self-regulation and leave implementation to 
the platforms who are best equipped to develop the required technical standards 
and tools. They are also able to adapt them flexibly and dynamically. Stakeholders 
from civil society as well as the social media platforms are involved in the process 
of drawing up a Code of Conduct; this makes the process more inclusive and en-
sures that the interests of civil society and researchers are considered. 
Figure 1: Set-up of a co-regulatory approach to tackle disinformation in the EU
Concretely, the EU should lay down principles and objectives for content dis-
tribution, content management processes of social media platforms as well as 
data access for researchers in a Regulation. These principles would then have to 
be translated into a Code of Conduct that contains detailed rules for the con-
duct of social media platforms. The Code of Conduct would be developed and 
adopted by a by a co-regulatory body whose composition would be laid down 
in the Regulation. It would be comprised, industry representatives, civil socie-
ty organisations and academics and would decide by consensus. The Code of 
Conduct would then need to be approved by the Commission. The co-regulatory 
body would also develop indicators, benchmarks and processes with regards to 
content distribution, inauthentic behaviour and algorithmic transparency. Social 
media companies would then have to develop their own measures to abide by 
the Code of Conduct. 
Their effectiveness would be assessed by an additional monitoring board made 
up of independent experts. On the proposal of the monitoring board, the co-reg-
ulatory body could reject individual measures and demand that companies 
implement new measures. If companies consistently fail to comply, the co-reg-
ulatory body could refer the matter to the Commission which in turn could man-
date certain actions by the company in question to make it compliant with the 
objectives and principles of the Regulation.
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3.1  A Code of Conduct against Disinformation
The Regulation should fix the following objectives by establishing principles for 
the Code of Conduct: 
•	 Increase transparency of content distribution. This entails both transparency 
about the algorithmic curation of content as well as transparency about the ma-
nipulation and abuse of social media platforms by fake accounts and coordinated 
inauthentic behaviour. Finally, transparency about automatic and human content 
moderation should also be increased. A principle of transparency should ensure 
that public scrutiny can be applied to the actual dynamics on social media.
•	 Improve content management. This entails principles and guidelines for human 
as well as automatic content moderation and for professional fact-checking or-
ganizations. A principle of responsibility for content moderation practices should 
lead to a more ethical and professional human content moderation as well as a 
new balance between fact checkers and social media platforms.
•	 Improve independent public knowledge about the social dynamics on social me-
dia platforms. This entails independent access for academic research to granular 
data in compliance with the GDPR. A principle of supervised openness should 
ensure that the social dynamics on social media platforms can be researched 
without breaches of privacy.
The co-regulatory body should then develop a regulatory design and Code of Con-
duct based on these principles. The Code of Conduct should include at least the 
following concrete rules and measures:
•	 Concrete indicators, benchmarks and standards for transparency reports on fake 
accounts and inauthentic behaviour and processes for independent verification 
of these reports. 
•	 Indicators, benchmarks and standards for transparency reports on content mod-
eration measures and processes for independent verification of these reports. 
•	 Rules for the ethical treatment and better journalistic and legal training of hu-
man content moderators. Human content moderators are currently low-wage 
employees of contractors to which social media companies have outsourced 
moderation of content. In many cases they do not receive the care and remu-
neration that would be warranted given the psychologically and physically diffi-
cult work they do. They also do often not receive sufficient journalistic and legal 
training before having to make content decisions.
•	 Rules and a process for data access of independent researchers to the platforms. 
Researchers should be free to choose their own research topics and should get 
access to all data needed to conduct it, in compliance with the GDPR.
•	 Rules to formalize the relationship between fact-checking organizations and so-
cial media platforms. Fact-checking organizations already play an important role 
in uncovering coordinated disinformation campaigns of domestic and foreign ac-
tors. In a Code of Conduct their role should be improved. They should be able to 
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force social media platforms to shut down or demonetize accounts with a strong 
follower base, for example more than 5000, if they can produce comprehensive 
evidence that these accounts are engaged in spreading disinformation as defined 
by the EU or engage in coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Currently, social media 
platforms are not bound by the findings of fact-checking organizations.
Independent monitoring of the effectiveness of the technical measures social me-
dia companies put in place will be key to the success of the co-regulatory approach. 
Especially in the case of transparency obligations on algorithmic content curation 
and coordinated inauthentic behaviour, the monitoring board must not only be in-
dependent but also be endowed with considerable resources and technical exper-
tise. It should consist of experts appointed by the European Commission. It should 
be able to scrutinize transparency reports and therefore have access to relevant 
data as well as to the digital architecture of social media platforms that drives 
their content curation. 
Conclusion
A co-regulatory approach is the best imperfect way forward to tackle disinforma-
tion in its current state given knowledge constraints about the societal effects of 
disinformation and the danger regulation poses to freedom of expression. But this 
does not mean that full-blown top-down regulation of social media companies 
should be discarded for all time. 
If a co-regulatory approach as described in this paper is successful it should lead 
to a considerable improvement in understanding the dynamics of disinformation 
online and the contributing factors behind it. This could in future lead to more di-
rect regulation of ad-driven business models or warrant regulation that addresses 
the current openness to abuse of platforms. 
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